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Conspiracy theories (CTs) are widespread ways by which people make sense of
unsettling or disturbing cultural events. Belief in CTs is often connected to problematic
consequences, such as decreased engagement with conventional political action or
even political extremism, so understanding the psychological and social qualities of CT
belief is important. CTs have often been understood to be “monological,” displaying the
tendency for belief in one conspiracy theory to be correlated with belief in (many) others.
Explanations of monologicality invoke a nomothetical or “closed” mindset whereby
mutually supporting beliefs based on mistrust of official explanations are used to
interpret public events as conspiracies, independent of the facts about those events
(which they may ignore or deny). But research on monologicality offers little discussion
of the content of monological beliefs and reasoning from the standpoint of the CT
believers. This is due in part to the “access problem”: CT believers are averse to
being researched because they often distrust researchers and what they appear to
represent. Using several strategies to address the access problem we were able to
engage CT believers in semi-structured interviews, combining their results with analysis
of media documents and field observations to reconstruct a conspiracy worldview –
a set of symbolic resources drawn on by CT believers about important dimensions of
ontology, epistemology, and human agency. The worldview is structured around six main
dimensions: the nature of reality, the self, the outgroup, the ingroup, relevant social and
political action, and possible future change. We also describe an ascending typology
of five types of CT believers, which vary according to their positions on each of these
dimensions. Our findings converge with prior explorations of CT beliefs but also revealed
novel aspects: A sense of community among CT believers, a highly differentiated
representation of the outgroup, a personal journey of conversion, variegated kinds of
political action, and optimistic belief in future change. These findings are at odds with the
typical image of monological CT believers as paranoid, cynical, anomic and irrational. For
many, the CT worldview may rather constitute the ideological underpinning of a nascent
pre-figurative social movement.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, monological belief system, worldviews, quasi-religion, interviews
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INTRODUCTION
Explaining complex societal events is itself complex. The use of
conspiracy theories (CTs) to make sense of destabilizing events
(like the assassination of major public figures, the unpredicted
destruction of major public buildings, sudden infectious disease
outbreaks) is a widespread response to world complexity
(e.g., van Prooijen, 2011). CTs involve symbolic coping which
transmutes the diffuse anxiety arising from such events into
specific threats caused by the purportedly malevolent action of
powerful actors (e.g., Harrison and Thomas, 1997; Wagner-Egger
and Bangerter, 2007; Byford, 2011). Since societal complexity and
uncertainty appear to be increasing, conspiratorial thinking may
increase as a response (e.g., Aupers, 2012).
A range of practical consequences of belief in CTs has
been documented. For example, exposure to anti-vaccine
CTs decreases people’s intentions to vaccinate (Jolley and
Douglas, 2014a). Similar society-wide public health implications
arose for polio vaccination in Nigeria (Falade and Bauer,
2017), where the vaccine was seen as the instrument of
a Western birth-control plot. In the United States, belief
that birth control and HIV/AIDS are forms of genocide
against African Americans is associated with negative attitudes
toward contraception (Bogart and Thorburn, 2006). In broader
terms, CT belief and exposure is associated with feelings of
powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Jolley and Douglas,
2014b), which, for specific anti-government and climate change
CTs decreases conventional political engagement and pro-
environmental intentions. Moreover, CT belief correlates with
political extremism (van Prooijen et al., 2015), and generalized
CT beliefs have been argued to be precursors of terrorism-
endorsing beliefs (Bartlett and Miller, 2010).
Since belief in CTs has significant practical consequences, it
is important to understand their associated psychological and
social factors. Psychological qualities associated with CT belief
include Machiavellianism (Douglas and Sutton, 2011), schizotypy
(Darwin et al., 2011), anomie, political cynicism, distrust in
authority, (Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Swami
et al., 2011). Specific aspects of cognitive processing associated
with CT belief include higher tendency to detect agency where
there may be none (e.g., Brotherton and French, 2015), which is
reduced by higher levels of education (Douglas et al., 2016), an
effect that may be explained by the general negative correlation
between belief in CTs and analytic processing style (Swami et al.,
2014). CT belief is also associated with processing errors and
biases – such as the conjunction fallacy (tendency to overestimate
the probability of co-occurring events: Brotherton and French,
2015), and the proportionality bias (attributing larger-scale
causes to more significant events: Leman and Cinnirella, 2007).
However, belief in CTs has also been found to be somewhat
responsive to circumstances: van Prooijen and Jostmann (2013)
found that inducing uncertainty increased conspiracy belief,
whilst exposure to specific CTs (e.g., concerning Princess Diana:
Douglas and Sutton, 2008; and John F Kennedy: Butler et al.,
1995) also increased it.
This paper offers two contributions to the study of CTs – one
theoretical, based on empirical data; and another methodological.
The theoretical contribution concerns the contention that CTs
are ‘monological’ (e.g., Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al.,
2012; Sutton and Douglas, 2014): belief in one CT predicts
belief in more CTs, providing the foundation of generalized
conspiratorial perspective. We suggest that assessing the nature
and degree of monologicality requires understanding the detailed
contents of a conspiratorial worldview. The methodological
contribution flows from the theoretical contribution; it concerns
how researchers can access such contents given that CT believers
are a “hard to access” population (Wood and Douglas, 2015).
Sustained theoretical development and empirical assessment of
monologicality requires addressing the methodological access
problem.
Monologicality suggests that CT thinking is a stable cognitive
style, disposition or trait. This possibility was outlined by
Goertzel’s (1994) suggestion that conspiratorial thinking offers
a general set of assumptions about authority “cover ups” which
are portable across specific topics or events. Social psychology
findings also suggest a “monological” tendency, whereby belief in
one conspiracy predicts belief in others. CTs may thus comprise
a network of mutually supporting beliefs about the functioning
of the social world (Swami et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012;
Sutton and Douglas, 2014). Belief in CTs, on this account, is
driven less by the specific contents of each CT and more by a
general conspiratorial mentality (Moscovici, 1987) or worldview
(Koltko-Rivera, 2004), whose main tenet involves rejection of
official explanations. This suggests that CT belief does not arise
from inferences drawn from a set of observations, but rather
from applying a conspiratorial worldview to those observations.
Indeed, Goertzel’s (1994, p. 739) original suggestion was that
monological CTs expressed a “closed” mind, unlike “dialogical”
belief systems, which “engage in a dialog with their context.”
He also suggested that CTs need not be monological – some
may be dialogical, if they are open to facts and disconfirming
evidence.
Similarly, Sutton and Douglas (2014) pointed out several
related problems with monologicality. The idea that CT belief
indicates closed mindedness is contradicted by its correlating
with openness to experience (Swami et al., 2010). The idea
that CT believers are politically cynical is contradicted by the
finding that CT belief sometimes correlates with support for
democratic principles (Swami et al., 2011). Moreover, people
can hold mutually contradictory CT beliefs, suggesting that
monologicality is less driven by the CT accounts per se than
by a more general belief in the deceptive nature of official
explanations. Monological explanation also lacks parsimony,
since third variables (e.g., personality traits) may affect belief
in various conspiracies, creating spurious correlations between
them.
Pursuing these issues, we contend that previous discussions
of monologicality have had little to say about the contents
of a putative conspiratorial worldview. They typically
sample members of student and general populations using
questionnaires to investigate their degree of belief in CTs
formulated as vignettes by the researchers: monologicality
is defined as the degree of correlation between belief in
multiple CTs. Such correlations are then correlated with other
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psychological variables, offering an important picture of the
structural landscape of CTs and those variables, as noted above.
However, it is a landscape that is only sparsely populated by
people’s concerns and the contents of their beliefs. Most social
psychology research on monologicality in CTs is thus deliberately
content-free, offering little account of the symbolic resources –
worldviews – people draw on in constructing CTs and their use
in everyday sensemaking [exceptions include Byford’s (2011)
critical account of CTs, and Lewis and Kahn’s (2005) description
of the cosmogony of CT guru David Icke]. This inattention
to symbolic content is surprising given that one key function
of CTs is precisely to make symbolic sense of destabilizing
events, which can allow individuals and groups to cope with
them.
Such past findings hint that individuals may adhere to a
conspiratorial worldview to varying degrees. This might explain
some of the conflicting findings indicated by Sutton and Douglas
(2014). However, it remains unclear how individuals use elements
of a conspiratorial worldview in sensemaking. More open-
ended methods (such as semi-structured interviews) would allow
participants to frame the content and degree of commitment to
CTs on their own terms and out of their concrete life situations.
They thereby allow finer-grained assessments of the content
of conspiratorial mentality and degree of monologicality. The
extent of their monologicality would emerge from their own
descriptions of their beliefs rather than from interpreting their
endorsement of a series of pre-determined items. And further
insight would be gained into the symbolic foundations of a
conspiratorial worldview. For example, epistemically, does a
person believe all of the CTs they believe in the same way –
the same level of conviction, responding to the same kinds of
doubts about societal events and threats, offering similar degrees
of uncertainty management? And ontologically, do the CTs all
draw on the same everyday commonsense ontology, or do they
posit entities or properties that go beyond the everyday, perhaps
positing a role for the supernatural?
However, any such research project is confronted by the
“access problem”: Wood and Douglas (2015, p. 6) note, people
“with a high degree of conspiracist ideation” are likely to be
averse to social science research, which is often associated
with universities that are “part of the problem”: distrust of
authority applies to universities as much as to governments and
corporations. The London School of Economics, for example,
takes a prominent role in David Icke’s conspiracist worldview
(Vice, 2012).
The possibility that not all CT believers are monological,
and that those who are may ground their monologicality
in contents that are not confined to distrust of authority,
flows from the quasi-religious approach to CTs (Franks
et al., 2013). This suggests that CTs may be analogous to
religious representations, involving explanations which use
representations of conspiratorial actors with supernatural or
super-human degrees of agency that reflect minimally counter-
intuitive departures from commonsense explanations. These
representations are communicated and reconstructed as part
of the social sensemaking process, as in social representations
theory (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999).
OUR STUDY
Against this backdrop, we aimed to document contents of CTs
and link them to their use in sensemaking and symbolic coping
by different individuals. These contents constitute materials for
reconstructing a conspiracy worldview, as well as the potentially
different ways in which individuals might subscribe to or engage
with it. According to Koltko-Rivera (2004, p. 3), a worldview is
a set of “beliefs and assumptions that describe reality. A given
worldview encompasses assumptions about a heterogeneous
variety of topics, including human nature, the meaning and
nature of life, and the composition of the universe itself, to
name but a few issues.” Therefore, a conspiracy worldview should
involve positionings on issues of ontology (the nature of reality),
epistemology (the nature of knowledge, what can be known),
and agency (human action and free will) (Koltko-Rivera, 2004).
Moreover, a specifically conspiracy worldview might also offer
resources for self-definition, enabling believers to make sense
of their life situation by positioning themselves relative to
society and reality, suggesting (following Moscovici, 1987) that it
involves representations of society, featuring distinctions between
groups, especially (pure, good) ingroups and (malevolent)
outgroups. Byford (2011) has analyzed the “anatomy” of CTs
as narratives and identified elements including conspiratorial
groups, conspiratorial plans and motifs like “manipulation of the
many by the few.” Additionally, a conspiratorial worldview might
function as a “meta-narrative” (Lyotard, 1979) that grounds
individual CT stories.
We pursued this goal in a research project featuring open-
ended collection and triangulation of qualitative data (most
prominently discursive productions) from multiple sources
(cultural products, participant observation, and semi-structured
interviews) supported by thematic analysis over the course of
two and a half years (May 2013 to December 2015). Like
many qualitative endeavors (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007),
our findings emerged progressively out of this process. The
main implication of our study is a tentative typology along a
spectrum of conspiracy worldviews and the thematic dimensions
that constitute them. This typology is informed by our empirical
data as well as by theoretical insights from relevant domains of
social psychology, sociology, and anthropology.
Data Collection
To investigate the detailed contents of the CT worldview,
we sought to engage CT believers in interviews, and had to
address the access problem, unlike past research which, in
using student or general population samples, or written and
on-line media, has thereby sought to circumvent it.
Recruitment of participants took place in two stages. These
stages were not prospectively planned: Stage 2 emerged from
the challenges arising in Stage 1. Stage 1 corresponds to a
more informal, explorative moment, whereas in Stage 2, we
conducted more formal data collection (interviews according to
a specific sampling strategy). In Stage 1, we aimed to approach
CT believers to understand the contents of their beliefs, and
document some of the cultural products that circulate in their
milieu (in websites, podcasts and their transcripts, books and
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mass media). As might be expected (Wood and Douglas, 2015),
accessing participants was not straightforward: Several direct
attempts failed. Individuals contacted via website chat-rooms
dedicated to CTs1 were unwilling to be interviewed by university
researchers, and one of us (MN) was subsequently excluded
from those chat-rooms. Similarly, MB attempted to make contact
with a CT source via a personal contact acting as middleman;
contact was refused because the London School of Economics
was deemed “part of the conspiratorial world.” Again, MH’s
invitation for an interview was rejected on the grounds that
the team of which he was a part were co-authors of a paper
the respondent had read and considered to misrepresent those
with conspiracy beliefs (Franks et al., 2013). A final example
arose at a protest gathering outside the Bilderberg Group meeting
in Watford, United Kingdom (June 8–9, 2013). After speaking
with a participant, MN asked them to take part in an interview
on CTs; this resulted in his being threatened and physically
assaulted. These altercations echo the “recursive fury” over
scientific analysis of conspiracist ideation (Lewandowsky et al.,
2013).
We nevertheless managed to recruit one respondent for an
interview via the Icke website as well as two other respondents
via a personal relation of MB. All three respondents attended
a presentation by David Icke at Wembley Stadium, United
Kingdom. The couple was subsequently interviewed at their
home abroad. We also engaged in participant observation at two
conspiracy theory-related events – the protest meeting outside
the Bilderberg Group meeting and a protest outside the Royal
Courts of Justice in London regarding the death of Dr David Kelly
(July 18, 2013).
In Stage 2 we learned lessons from Stage 1, approaching access
more indirectly. We addressed two aspects of our recruitment
attempts which appeared to compound the access problem. One
concerned participants’ perceptions of how they and their beliefs
would be characterized by the research. Another concerned
the participants’ overall perception of the research and the
researchers – their broader sense of our trustworthiness. These
are often cited as key issues in accessing hard-to-reach samples
in ethnography or other fieldwork (e.g., Norman, 2009; O’Reilly,
2009; Bengry-Howell and Griffin, 2012; Browne and McBride,
2015). While we did not engage in ethnography, our approach
used methods frequent in such research.
Regarding the first, our experience in Stage 1 confirmed Wood
and Douglas’s (2015) finding that CT believers resist the label
“conspiracy theory,” which they take to stigmatize them and their
attempts to understand the world – excluding them from “the
imagined community of reasonable interlocutors” (Husting and
Orr, 2007, p. 127). They instead preferred self-descriptions as
being involved in “research” about how to explain unsettling
events, seeking the truth about them, and thereby having an
interest in “alternative explanations” or “alternative worldviews.”
The use of non-stigmatizing labeling during recruitment was
thus essential to communicate our aim of understanding CT
beliefs from the perspectives of the participants, rather than
imposing a particular perspective on them or seeking to debunk
1www.davidicke.com
them. We thus were careful to avoid the term “conspiracy
theory” during recruitment and the interviews (except when
participants were themselves invited to qualify or debate its
meaning and application). Additionally, to enhance trust we
used descriptions CT believers employed to describe themselves.
Hence, our invitation described people who were “truth seekers”
or “change seekers,” who “have alternative worldviews and beliefs,
and may be critical of mainstream media, politics, economics,
religion, or society.”
Regarding the second aspect, our Stage 1 experience suggested
that direct contact with potential participants would be difficult,
since LSE is often seen as ‘part of the problem.’ We thus adopted
an indirect approach, via a trusted intermediary or gatekeeper,
whom the participants themselves would accept as indicating
our credibility. This was achieved via the webmasters of several
on-line communities in the South East of England. MH asked
the webmasters to place a request for participants on their
community websites. Interested members then contacted MH
directly to ask any questions before committing themselves to
involvement and to arrange timing and locations of interviews.
This ensured that the research project was first framed within
a non-judgmental context which supported the free expression
of participants’ beliefs. Although indirect, the approach did not
conceal MH’s academic affiliation; to withhold this information
until later would likely have suggested deception and undermined
the development of trust.
Participants
We interviewed participants between July 2013 and May 2015. In
Stage 1, we recruited three participants who were interviewed on
July 19, 2013, in London (a 43-year-old man, hereafter R1.1), and
August 4–5, 2013, and in a location outside the United Kingdom
hereafter R1.2 (man, 57 years) and R1.3 (woman, in her late 40s).
In Stage 2, 36 interviews took place with each of 18 participants
being interviewed twice. We only report findings here from the
first interview with each participant (hereafter, R1–R18), as the
second interview focused on political participation in general
and less on CTs. Initial interviews took place between 9 and 23
March, 2015, in Kent (n = 2), Central London (n = 9), Greater
London (n= 1), Suffolk (n= 2), and via remote communication,
e.g., Skype (n = 4). Follow-up interviews took place in the same
locations in late May 2015. There were 10 men and 8 women, ages
ranging from 23 to 70.
Interviews
In both stages, we used semi-structured interviews, which
outlined the research purpose, after which participants gave
consent to take part; interviews were conducted in English
and audiorecorded. The Stage 1 interview protocol focused on
respondents’ personal backgrounds, on the ideas of David Icke,
on religion and spirituality, and on contacts with like-minded
others or non-believers. The Stage 2 interview protocol developed
from Stage 1 and asked participants to describe how they came
to be interested in alternative explanations, to indicate the kinds
and range of CTs (if any) they believed, to reflect on the content
of those beliefs and their connections with “new age” and other
beliefs, and to indicate the kinds of social and political actions
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and relations they typically engaged in. Interviews typically lasted
60–90 min.
Data Preparation and Thematic Analysis
All interviews were transcribed verbatim, but without detailed
transcription of backchannel utterances, disfluencies, or other
paralinguistic information. We employed thematic analysis
to discover the range of contents produced by participants.
Thematic analysis is widely used in the analysis of texts
and transcripts, well-suited to exploring worldviews and social
representations (e.g., Braun and Clarke, 2006; Joffe, 2012). It
assesses and categorizes the kinds of meanings that are expressed,
in a way that stays close to the texts themselves. Our thematic
analysis combined both bottom-up, data-driven and theory-
driven, top-down elements. Our method was abductive, the
simultaneous ordering of data and emergence of a conceptual
framework into a coherent logic that offers a productive guide
for research.
Given the prior research on worldviews and CT rhetoric
described above, we started from an initial list of theoretically
relevant themes like “the nature of reality”, “the ingroup,” “the
outgroup,” “the self,” or “sense of agency.” In Stage 1, we
triangulated data from several sources: interview transcripts
(with R1.1, R1.2, and R1.3), blogs and materials produced by
CT entrepreneurs (most prominently David Icke, e.g., a DVD
recording of his Wembley event, books and web discussions)
and participant observations. Subsequently, the original themes
were modified (and developed into more specific subthemes) in
discussions amongst the authors. The outcome was an initial,
informal mapping of key themes of a conspiratorial worldview.
In Stage 2, the 18 interview transcripts (R1-18) were distributed
amongst AB, MB, BF, and MH, who coded the interviews
individually according to the themes generated in Stage 1. This
procedure suggested that while Stage 1 themes also arose in Stage
2 interviews, they could not fully accommodate the range and
details of contents in Stage 2. As a consequence, over a series
of meetings, we refined the Stage 1 themes to accommodate new
variations that emerged. This resulted in a final list of six themes:
(A) Reality: Participants’ views of reality – the causal forces in
society that might sustain any CTs to which they subscribed,
and whether appearances can be taken at face value or not.
(B) Self: Participants’ views of themselves – their biography and
any significant events by which they became interested in
CTs, and their subsequent personal development.
(C) The outgroup(s): Participants’ views of any outgroups
defined relative to CTs – e.g., conspiratorial group(s), other
non-conspiring members of society.
(D) The ingroup: Participants’ views of any community or
ingroup to which they belonged – e.g., other CT believers,
prominent individuals who act as leaders or ‘heroes’ in those
communities or in the promulgation of those beliefs.
(E) Action: Participants’ CT-related actions – e.g., political
engagement, social meetings.
(F) The Future: Participants’ views of how the world will be
in future – based on continuation of conspiracies or on
successful challenges to those conspiracies.
In analyzing the Stage 2 interviews, the variations in the
way participants talked about these themes suggested potentially
different depths of engagement with the contents of the CT
worldview: starting from an inkling that “things are not what they
seem to be” and moving toward full endorsement of a conspiracy
worldview via various stages. This observation was the basis for
our typology.
RESULTS: AN ORDERED TYPOLOGY OF
CONSPIRATORIAL MENTALITIES
We present results as follows. In section “The Conspiracy
Worldview Reconstructed”, we describe our reconstruction of
the conspiratorial worldview in its fully fledged form, as an
overview of our findings. In section “Typology of Individual
Variations on the Conspiracy Worldview”, we describe our
typology of individual variations on the conspiratorial worldview,
according to the themes identified. In section “Thematic
Variations”, we describe variations on each of the themes.
Wherever appropriate, we reference individual interviews or
include verbatim quotations from the interviews as illustrations.
The Conspiracy Worldview
Reconstructed
A graphical summary of the reconstructed conspiracy worldview
is given in Figure 1: this features the five main themes – the
outgroup, the self, the ingroup, action, and the future, as below.
The outgroup is structured around the official narratives of
events, which are illusions that hide the reality that is depicted
in CTs. There are three hierarchically ordered subgroups in the
outgroup. The first group is the “sheep,” the masses of anonymous
people who believe in official narratives. They are dormant,
being sedated by fast food, popular culture and entertainment,
religion, chemtrails, vaccines, and the pursuit of normative
goals like money, family and the like. They are also monitored
via invasive surveillance techniques. The second group is the
“middle management,” individuals and groups who occupy
visible positions of expertise and power in society, including
politicians, police, the military, business consultants, or scientists.
They are responsible for maintaining the sheep in thrall, and they
answer to the third group, the “evil elites” (Campion-Vincent,
2005). These latter are the actors who have true power: secret
cabals acting in the shadows, controlling middle management
to achieve and maintain world domination to further their own
ends. Evil elites can be government organizations like the CIA
or MI6, multinational corporations or conglomerates (e.g., Big
Pharma), networks (e.g., the Bilderberg group), royalty, particular
ethnic groups (the Jews) or even reptilian aliens.
The self is seen as on an epistemic and/or spiritual journey
of discovery that can involve several stages. We distinguish
five types of CT belief which correspond to those stages, with
qualitatively different ways of being conspiratorially minded
based on different degrees of elaboration of CT ideation; the
process along them may indicate a path of conversion. Type
0 comprises individuals who subscribe to the official version
of events, the sheep in the outgroup. The CT journey begins
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FIGURE 1 | The conspiracist worldview: an elaborate hierarchy of deception and progressive degrees of insight.
with unease with the way the world is, or a sense of being
different or not fitting in. Interactions or altercations with sheep
lead to the self being ridiculed or criticized, pushing him/her
further out of the system and toward initial belief in specific CTs
(this corresponds to Types 1–3). At some point, a conversion
experience or spiritual awakening occurs, sometimes triggered
by a traumatic personal experience (illness, loss of a loved one)
or a public event like 9/11. It is at this point that the self
subscribes to a fully fledged conspiratorial worldview, either
postulating a conventional ontology of evil elites (Type 4) like
“Big Pharma” or MI6 or a supernatural ontology (Type 5)
like reptilian shapeshifting aliens. Types 4 and 5 are thus not
differentiated by the extent of their conspiratorial belief but by
the content of that belief.
The ingroup comprises individuals who have awakened to
the reality behind CTs: like-minded truth seekers on similar
research or spiritual journeys, sometimes acquiring an almost
mystical sense of collective agency. Related to this community
are leader figures or “CT heroes,” varying types of individual
to whom participants may have different forms of allegiance –
e.g., maverick intellectuals or scientists with contra-establishment
views (e.g., Chomsky), gurus like David Icke, or historical figures
like Christ or Buddha. This ingroup has porous boundaries
interviews typically lasted 60–90 min, with other communities
(e.g., hackers or the Occupy movement). Ingroup members
communicate with each other in vivo and on-line and sometimes
engage in coordinated political action (e.g., organizing protests,
joining a commune).
The fully elaborated conspiratorial worldview involves a vision
of the future where change will come, overthrowing the evil elites.
This may arise “naturally” from increasing public awareness of
cover-ups, or from additional direct actions. So the sensemaking
function of conspiratorial mentality is connected to mobilizing
or demobilizing political action. The personal future of the self is
entwined with this macrodestiny in that it is the culmination and
vindication of the journey.
Typology of Individual Variations on the
Conspiracy Worldview
The data revealed substantial variation between participants’
beliefs, which forms a typology (see Table 1).
Type 1: Something Is Not in Order
One participant (R6) expressed this dissatisfaction with the
status quo and mainstream problem solutions, a sense that the
world is out of joint, and a desire to proffer solutions within
commonsense ontology and conventional values. R6 explicitly
disavows the relevance of CTs, not considering their potential
truth or falsity: “I don’t mean to make that sound like there’s
a conspiracy such as the Illuminati conspiracy. I am not, I
don’t delve into that. Just, is there an over-influence? I don’t
mean, I don’t believe that our politicians are evil people.”
R6 saw themself as an “issue entrepreneur,” offering a website
and criteria for developing societal solutions like “regulated
capitalism” with a “greater happiness index.” So Type 1’s unease
is an entirely conventional questioning of political orthodoxies,
which does not see the relevance or potential truth of CTs. No
particularly high degree of epistemic uncertainty attaches to this
position.
Type 2: There Is More to Reality Than Meets the Eye
Two participants (R4 and R15) expressed this dissatisfaction with
the status quo and a sense that there is really more at play in
the world than appears to be the case to ordinary observers.
This is broadly skeptical, aiming not to make “false negative”
assumptions about reality, suspending (dis)belief pending further
evidence. By contrast with Type 1, Type 2 sees CTs as relevant
and possibly believable: R15 says (re 9/11): “In my opinion, the
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mainstream story is a load of crap but at the same time, I can’t
say with any certainty what really happened. I just don’t think
it is as it appears . . . I can’t say what has happened but I don’t
believe with certainty.” And R4 suggests that the decision about
whether to follow CTs is an active one: “We have the choice
of what we will buy into,” and chooses not to do so because
“belief in this is pretty damned sinister,” and leads “people [to]
give their energy to negativity.” This uses commonsense ontology
and expresses uncertainty about official explanations. R15 says,
“I really hate it when people shoot down . . . ‘CTs’ and I’m like,
‘why, why, why did you shoot this down? Because BBC News told
you that Al Qaeda flew a plane into a building.’ That to me is
the definition of narrow-mindedness. I mean I don’t know what
happened, I have no idea what happened . . . I can’t say with any
certainty this did happen and this didn’t happen.” R15 explicitly
juxtaposes a potentially believable specific CT with unbelievable
general CTs: “Like 9/11, I think it is perfectly reasonable and not
crazy to say that one is suspicious of the mainstream story and
that’s fine most people can get on board with that. The minute
you put David Icke into the mix with his Reptilian nonsense,
you are then devaluing a whole field.” R4 also expressed open-
mindedness about CT and non-CT explanations: “that middle
zone of ‘I believe it and I don’t believe it.’ I don’t have to come
down to one side or the other.” Type 2’s unease thus runs deeper
than Type 1, accepting the relevance and the possible truth of
specific CTs.
Type 3: Some Official Narratives Are Not True
One participant (R10) expressed this view, advancing a CT to
address one specific issue, but disavowing generalized CTs. This
CT used commonsense ontology and assumptions to explain
the behavior of specific conspiratorial agents. R10 suggested that
“chemtrails” produced by aeroplanes have not been satisfactorily
explained; following investigation, R10 suggests it may connect to
weather manipulation, but believes there is a cover-up. For R10
this CT belief has no monological extrapolation: for example, of
the Illuminati, and New World Order, they say: “I don’t know. I’m
not too familiar with that. I don’t really know what I believe about
that.” However, the general uncertainty is not ameliorated –
other conspiracies could be possible, though there is no clear
evidence either way. For R10 this is because of a lack of accurate
information: “If you are going to have a society where a lot of
truth isn’t told and if there are outlets for truth-tellers why would
you allow that? It would be so easy to create a misinformation site
to discredit that,” created by “people who are currently in control
of society.” This lack of trust in authority and its explanations
does not generate monologicality: CTs apply to specific cases
but are not the default frame of reference In Type 3, but even
more in Type 4, participants indicate increasing concern with
the deceptive nature of official narratives (Sutton and Douglas,
2014).
Type 4: All Official Narratives Are Illusions: The
Mainstream versus Reality
Several participants (R2, R8, R11, R12, R13, R14, and R16)
expressed this monological conspiratorial worldview as a default
frame of reference. This uses commonsense ontology of
conspiring agents with, as the quasi-religious account of CTs
(Franks et al., 2013) suggests, a minimally counter-intuitive
understanding of their actions and agency; ordinary people
and groups able to control things which are usually seen as
outside human control, e.g., financial markets, climate change
and variation. Supernormal agency in specific areas is ascribed
to normal actors. Analogous religious representations (e.g.,
Sperber, 1996; Boyer, 2001) involve uncertainty because their
implications are not fully processed – for example, in the
Roman Catholic Mass the wine is simultaneously wine and the
blood of Christ (Franks, 2003). The uncertain but potentially
malign qualities of authority agents supports a mistrust of
authority. For example, R2 aims to develop a “unifying theory of
political economy,” to explain financial crises and governments’
complicitness in them, and explain 9/11, where “what can’t be
true is an official story”; this lack of trust extends to official
‘false flags’ regarding other CTs by R2 (e.g., the murder of
JFK on November 22, 1963, or the Charlie Hebdo attacks
of January 7, 2015). R11 mirrors this pattern: one CT –
the legal issues surrounding the United Kingdom’s decision
to go to war in Iraq in 2002 – is used as the paradigm
case for generalizing to others (e.g., 9/11/2001, 7/7/2005), so
that ultimately, “we can no longer trust our government.”
Hence, a monological lack of trust in official sources generates
widespread CTs.
Type 5: All of Reality Is an Illusion: The
Ontological-Symbolic Turn
Several participants (R1.1, R1.2, R1.3, R1, R3, R5, R7, R9,
R17, and R18) expressed this fully fledged conspiratorial
worldview. However, unlike Type 4, at least some of the key
agents hypothesized go beyond commonsense ontologies to
supernatural explanations incorporating non-human agents or
human agents with non-human lineages. R1, following David
Icke, speaks of alien reptilian entities which “feed on fear and
lower energies which is why there is again a certain control
because they are manipulating the planet.” R5 refers to contacts
with UFOs, and a controlling human “cabal” originating in
non-human aliens. R7 also refers to controlling aliens, but does
not suggest these are reptilian nor any human contact with
them. Such entities are able to demonstrate control via capacities
that go beyond the human – an ontology of supernatural
entities possessing supernatural agency. Whereas for Type 4
there appears an essential connection between the espoused
CTs and their monological generalization, for Type 5 there is
no such connection; instead, what guarantees monologicality is
the appeal to an ontology populated with supernatural agency
which permeates all important areas of life. Here we hear of the
lizards and shapeshifters who control things behind the scenes.
The distrust of authority may be a consequence rather than a
cause of monologicality. The all-embracing explanation renders
the CTs immune from doubt. Nor do they answer to publicly
available empirical data in the way that Type 4 at least has
the scope to do. As R1 comments, “It doesn’t matter if you
think, ‘oh this guy that everybody is talking about is absolutely
nuts,’ because it is part of my journey of understanding my
existence.”
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Summary of Typology
Several key points arise from this typology. First, not all CT
belief is monological – it is possible to entertain or believe
in single CTs (Types 2 and 3) but reject others and not
subscribe to a full-blown conspiratorial worldview (Types 4 and
5). Second, some monologicality may derive from a lack of
trust in official explanations (Type 4), but other cases derive
from an all-encompassing supernatural explanation of reality
(Type 5). Third, overlaying this typology appears to be a
curvilinear pattern of degree of epistemic certainty. The end-
points of the typology express epistemic “closure” or certainty.
Types 0 and 1 involve an acceptance of the commonsense
ontology of agents and causes that frame official narratives.
Type 2 uses the same ontology but adds doubt in questioning
whether all official narratives are true. Type 3 offers more
doubt in explicitly distrusting specific official narratives, but
expresses closure in adhering to single CTs. Type 4 involves
generalized distrust of official narratives, introducing doubt as
part of an overarching conspiracy worldview. Type 5 involves
a supernatural ontology that reframes official narratives in its
own terms – here, distrust of authority is framed by a lack
of doubt about how to explain its untrustworthiness (i.e., the
supernatural ontology). Such a general curvilinear pattern of
epistemic certainty suggests that CTs are likely to succeed most
clearly in symbolic coping or anxiety reduction when they are
part of a monological worldview – single CTs seem likely rather to
exacerbate anxiety. Fourth, Types 4 and 5 participants expressed
complex sets of interconnected beliefs in which there was no
blanket rejection of authority or embracing of all CT-supporting
evidence – they were suspicious not only of authority but also
(though to a lesser degree) alternative explanations; moreover,
beyond merely denying authorized explanations, they advanced
complex narratives about the interconnections between specific
conspiracies (e.g., using the differentiation of the outgroup
in Figure 1). The worldview that underpins monologicality,
for our participants, goes beyond the denialism or “closed”
mind (Goertzel, 1994) often expressed in the literature. Our
observations thus suggest that monologicality is not a defining
feature of belief in conspiracy, but a variable end-point on an
escalating spectrum of conspiracy-mindedness.
Thematic Variations
Reality and Ontology
Sutton and Douglas (2014) suggested that a potential underlying
feature of monologicality is the deceptive nature of official
narratives. This corresponds in our interviews to different
positions on the nature of reality. Broadly, the nature of
reality is unproblematic for Types 0–3 participants, even though
uncertainty is expressed as to some anomalies. Some Types 4 and
5 participants expressed variations on the theme that the fabric
of everyday reality is an illusion which is intelligible only to the
selected few, similar to the Platonic cave allegory (R16) or films
like “The Matrix” (R16). Some (Type 5) opined that “real” reality
is beyond the three-dimensional world of the five senses, to be
sensed by engaging in practices like meditation or reiki (R10 and
R16). Such engagement involves mystical experiences like feeling
energy flows or developing a collective consciousness: “in what
the Vedics call the Cochic record, the cloud hard drive in the sky
that we all share, so each of us has a folder in that hard drive that
we record our memories, thoughts and feelings and emotions and
whatnot. And as long as you’re in this life form and you’re held
with the five senses in the three dimensions in the time-based
worldview, then all you can ever recall is anything you’ve written
in your own folder. But at some point you become capable of
receiving information from the whole cloud” (R17).
Self-view and Self-development
Many participants explicitly rejected the label “conspiracy
theory,” corroborating findings of Wood and Douglas (2015).
This rejection was independent of participants’ positioning in
the typology. Some suggested the label is used to deliberately
undermine alternative explanations, since it categorizes together
both “reasonable” alternative explanations using everyday
ontologies for single events and more complex conspiratorial
narratives using more novel ontologies (e.g., R1.1, R5, and R11).
The evident oddity of novel ontologies is used by association to
undermine reasonable explanations (see Husting and Orr, 2007).
The CT label may also diminish the force of the argument by
shifting the focus onto the credibility of the CT believer (R10,
R11, and R7). R15 suggests, “I think unfortunately, these things
do get lumped together, these alternative viewpoints or CTs,
everything gets lumped together. And when you have got some
crazy man like David Icke spouting nonsense all the people who
are then saying quite sensible things, all get lumped together
as loony, tin-foil crazies.” One suggested the label ‘conspiracy
theory’ was coined by the CIA in the 1950s to discredit people
inquiring into governmental “black ops” activities (R2). Another
suggested the label was a way to shut down a potentially
illuminating conversation: “It’s become . . . a weapon to close
down the conversation. “Oh, so you believe in CTs, do you?”
Where can you go with that? Quite often it’s a putdown” (R1.1).
As a consequence, participants preferred to describe themselves
as researchers who are “seeking after the truth” or knowledge, or
developing alternative explanations (R8, R1, R15, R9, R13, and
R11). As R11 says, “I am always after the truth. It’s probably why
I am considered a conspiracy theorist.”
When asked how their interest in alternative explanations
began, many cited a gradual progression based on a combination
of personal issues and “projects,” which had been expedited
by their experiences of major public events. Types 4 and 5
participants referred to early experiences of being different
(R1.3), traumatic personal experiences such as severe illness
of self or a close other, or bankruptcy and homelessness (R3,
R12, R13, R9, R18, and R11); some reported specific exceptional
episodes such as out of body experiences, experience of UFOs and
aliens (R9 and R16). Against this backdrop of general questioning
of reality, specific public events were often referred to by Types
4 and 5 participants as catalysts for their interest in CTs – e.g.,
9/11/2001 (R2: “9/11 did it for me”; R17, R12, R7, and R11), the
financial crash of 2008 or the Iraq War (R2 and R7).
Some participants (independently of type) referred to family
problems and enmeshing social relationships (R7 and R4), and
others to an interest in meditation and psychological processes
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(R5, R10, R1, and R3). These appear to have progressively
triggered questioning of received explanations. For some, this
generated an intensive interest in philosophical questions or
‘mysteries’ (R7, R16, R4, and R10) – e.g., R16 wanted “to be part
of the 1% that understands Plato’s cave.”
These findings are striking: to understand why CT thinking is
“sticky” (i.e., an attractive and persuasive way of thinking, which
resists change), we may need to consider not only its content
and role in individual and social anxiety reduction. We also need
to consider how CTs emerge from the personal-development,
epistemic and social-political “projects” that first led people to
consider alternative explanations. Some such projects suggest a
gradual process punctuated by “conversion” episodes leading to
Types 4 or 5 monological outcomes, consonant with the quasi-
religious approach (Franks et al., 2013).
The Outgroup: The Conspirators and the Majority
Participants described a structured outgroup. Types 2 and
3 participants typically referred to only two subgroups: the
conspirators and the controlled majority. They also expressed
uncertainty about whether the conspirators really performed
all of the alleged actions. Thus, R15 (Type 2) suggested a role
for United States governmental and military organizations in
covering up their own deliberate engineering of major events
(such as Pearl Harbor, 9/11) to deflect attention away from their
real activities and to legitimize attempts to further extend their
reach. R10 (Type 3) mentioned that some people have beliefs
about the Illuminati aiming to establish a New World Order, but
“I’m not really sure.”
Greatest differentiation of the outgroup was offered by Types
4 and 5 participants, who differentiated three subgroups: the
wider controlled, non-agentic class who believe in conventional
explanations (“sheep” in Figure 1), plus two parts of the
“ruling class.” The “evil elites” (Figure 1) are hidden agents
who define the ends and nature of the conspiracies, and the
mid-level proximal agents (“middle management” in Figure 1)
are observable actors that provide the means for the elite groups’
ends and promulgate the authorized explanations.
This results, for some (R1, R3, and R12), in a society
managed by fear. Middle management (e.g., governments,
armed forces, police and the “Big Four” accounting firms)
engage in conspiracies that are understood by ordinary
conventional explanations, using everyday ontology and
possessing commonsense qualities (Type 4). But these are merely
the agents of the real elite. R3 suggests that governments are
“puppets,” the police are “minions” and the real rulers are in
the shadows. Others gave examples of conspiracies – e.g., in
dealing with pedophilia in establishment circles, the United
Kingdom Prime Minister was sidestepped (R14), and one or two
figureheads from middle management were “sacrificed,” allowing
allow the evil elite to maintain its conspiracies whilst giving the
appearance to the sheep of rooting out the culprits (R1). Middle
management is thus a buffer against real change, even when
apparently held to account.
The true evil elites are hidden from view, possessing qualities
that depart from ordinary ontology to varying degrees, often
viewed as shadowy entities with mythical histories. Most are
understood in terms of powerful families with associated
bloodlines or religious dynasties with associated forms of
initiation and membership, such as the United Kingdom Royal
Family, the Rothschilds, Rockefellers, Bushes, Clintons, all of
whom are interconnected with the Holy Roman Empire, Saudi
Arabia (R16, R2, R9, R13, and R12), or the Illuminati (R1 and R5).
Together they form a “structural power elite, with interlocking
structures” (R2), closed to all outsiders. They share an aim for
self-replication in the pursuit of power and the maintenance of
control – at any cost to human life.
As R17 comments, “fish rots from the head downward”: evil
elites control the establishment, setting up educational, industrial,
financial, and governmental institutions to serve their malign
aims in controlling what the sheep do and believe. In Type 5, the
account of evil elites appeals to non-commonsense ontological
assumptions about agents – e.g., the elite really are “reptilians”
(R1), directly expressing Icke’s “alien lizard” iconography (Lewis
and Kahn, 2005); or they have a lineage in other alien life
forms and UFOs (R5, R7, and R17). For some, this issues in the
sweeping metaphor that “earth is a slave ship” (R5) or a “prison
planet” (R1) controlled by those aliens or their descendants.
When talking about the sheep, Types 4 and 5 participants
in particular referred to middle management’s “sedation” of the
populace – e.g., via alcohol, entertainment (football, TV, the royal
family, fast food), and having to work hard and be self-interested
in order to make a living (R1.1, R12, R9, R3, and R7). As R7
put it, “Yeah, you know the ‘normies’ is what I call them, people
going to work, doing their job, not questioning anything, but
all they’re doing is spending money on the system and keep it
circulating so that banks are corporating the money.” The sheep
are thereby happy to be part of a passive, ignorant “herd” or
“hive” (R9, R13, R14, and R12), leading to a state of “collective
unconsciousness” (R9). Interactions with sheep about CT-related
topics often led to conflict or ostracism (R1: “try to ridicule you
and try to convince you that you have lost the plot”), requiring
them to be circumspect in raising such topics (R1.1: “Most of
the time, people don’t want to listen, you have to get people into
a certain mental space for them to listen properly”) or even to
progressively avoid them.
All participants referred to the mass media as a significant
part of the control process: filtering information, leaving out
important issues and presenting infantile, sound-bite journalism
and entertainment (R1, R3, R4, R5, and R10). The media sets
the agenda for what can and cannot be discussed; as R15 put
it, the “dog doesn’t bark, the journalistic machine doesn’t work,
politics is broken”, perhaps because as R5 notes, the mass
media worldwide are “controlled by the same three or four
organizations.” However, alternative media may be no more
reliable: “I would say for every conspiracy theory ‘theory,’ there’s
an equal number of misinformation sites” (R10).
The ingroup: Truth Seekers, Awake and Connected
Regarding ingroups, participants reported a mixed picture,
independent of CT type. Developing CT interests, for some,
created difficulties in their relational ingroups: family, friends, or
colleagues mocked or discredited their views (R1, R7, R14, R18,
R3, and R15), leading them to be reluctant to discuss the issues
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with them. This led some to seek social contacts with other people
interested in CTs. Their on-line and in vivo contacts generally
involved developing alternative explanations (R3: “helping you
connect the dots by talking together”), by talking with like-
minded people who are critical, open-minded, anti-establishment
and well-read (R2, R10, R14, and R15). The social connections are
key to reinforcing, rehearsing and maintaining CTs, with some
noting that group membership had made them “more convinced”
of CTs (R7), perhaps because it “keeps you knowing” (R14).
What connects the CT ingroup is that they are all truth-
seekers, and “It’s wanting a fair and just society, and what
wakes people up? I don’t know, you are either asleep or awake
because once you are awake, you can’t ignore it” (R12). The
metaphor of truth-seekers being “awake” (a recurrent motif in
Icke’s writings) compared to the “sleeping” sheep, was widespread
(R1, R2, R4, R9, R10, R12, and R14). Other expressions also
differentiated the ingroup from the controlled class – “we” have
greater “awareness” (R3, R5, R8, R13, R14, and R17), or “our”
eyes are “open” and theirs are closed (R3, R7, R9, R15, and
R18). As with all in-group communication, the informational
and the affiliational overlap (Enfield, 2006). There were two
significant aspects to this. First, participants refer to the groups as
offering a “community” (R17, R3, R4, and R8), a “spiritual side”
(R8) which supports collaboration and connections that “express
humanity,” helping people to “wake up, get back to connecting
rather than atomized” (R4). Second, for some, the group offers
a sense of positive, collective agency, which could substitute for
the failed or inappropriate agency of governments and media. In
the groups, they “realize that we are more than we think we are
collectively” (R17), and “collectively there’s a quickening, raising
of awareness, things ain’t right” (R17), so that the group identity
has the common denominator of a positive outlook in the battle
for social change (R4). In the groups, R14 suggests, “you feel like
you could make a change because everyone felt like that, we could
make a change because we have the power because we are the
consumers. We could break down the 1% if we all agreed”. More
succinctly, R5 expressed this as “we are a supreme minority, but
growing.”
Although our Types 4 and 5 participants all saw themselves as
connected to communities or groups affiliated around a general
CT stance, Type 5 added a pan-human dimension based on their
spiritual beliefs: “We are an organism collectively” (R17), or ‘I
believe that somehow we are all connected universally.” Some saw
this as the origin of their beliefs (e.g., R5: “I get these knowings. I
know things is all I can say and I guess it comes from some sort
of universal collective wisdom”), or as a basis for understanding
themselves (e.g., R1: “It’s like everybody is on the same journey,
same path, but people are at different stages”).
But group membership also brings the possibility of schism,
and two participants expressed unhappiness at the restrictions
of previous groups. One indicated disenchantment with the
Occupy Movement, which led them to be less active in meet up
groups, and to limit interaction to only “talking” to national and
international groups, principally on the internet: (R2). Another
(R9) was frustrated that the meet up group’s committee structure
“paralyzed” discussions, effectively censoring the range of CTs
and issues canvassed.
One key aspect of reinforcing beliefs and norms, and
supporting ingroup coherence, is the relation between a group
and a leader (Haslam et al., 2011): more successful (and more
positively evaluated) leaders are often seen as highly prototypical
or ideal members of the ingroup. Our participants had a highly
developed sense of who were the prototypical – leading – truth
seekers, and often deferred to their knowledge and referred to
them in discussion. Some were domain-specific – “maverick”
scientists with expertise in areas like chemistry, physics and
archeology (R2, R9, R10, and R18), or economics and politics
(R1, R2, R13, R6, and R14); such references often used rhetorical
devices indicating the arcane knowledge at stake and positioning
the CT believer relative to the interviewer: for example, “have
you heard of . . .?” (R2). Others – particularly Types 4 and 5 –
were more general, identifying with or admiring a key figure
as a prototypical truth seeker or CT researcher; many cited
David Icke as an inspiration in uncovering conspiracies long
before other people (R1.1, R1.2, R1.3, R1, R2, R3, R5, R8, R16,
and R17). For example, R3 suggested that David Icke “caused
me to expand my way of thinking and join dots and put this
and that together.” However, some acknowledged mixed feelings
about the respectability of some of his material (R9 and R17),
even though “not one of his books has ever been challenged
or faced with a law suit” (R5). Others also cited figures from
popular culture (e.g., Russell Brand: R10, R12, and R14) or those
who run CT-focused internet sites (e.g., Alex Jones: R1, R6,
and R9). Some also referred to historically “great figures” who
revealed hidden wisdom – marking the lineage of the ingroup
as part of a long history of being critical of and vilified by the
mainstream: the Buddha (R1 and R3), Jesus (R3), Gandhi (R1
and R14). Others cited major intellectual figures, again indicating
the apparent reasonableness of their own stance: Orwell (R1
and R17), Marx or Chomsky (R13). Participants typically cited
individuals who have accepted the threat to worldly status
associated with challenging the status quo, making what Henrich
(2009) calls CREDs (credibility enhancing displays) in which CT
declarations gain extra force by their declarers’ paying the costs
of exposure to public opprobrium. Public vilification amounts
to proof of concept. Such people are therefore respected for
epistemic reasons but also admirable for personal and moral
reasons. This is another aspect of the conspiracist worldview
consonant with quasi-religiosity. Interestingly, whilst most of our
participants expressed admiration for fearless researchers and
respect for their empirical work, the strategy of placing oneself in
such an illustrious lineage (epistemic and personal identification)
was used only by participants of Types 4 and 5 and Type 1 (R6) –
evidently, for quite different rhetorical and epistemic reasons.
We note three implications of deference to CT leaders: first,
it is selective – CT believers employ many information sources,
and few accept everything the leaders promulgate (they retain
a degree of criticality even about their heroes); second, they are
conscious of those leaders’ public credibility and of the need to
persuade others of the reasonableness of their own stance. Third,
such deference varies according to CT type.
The connection with other believers in CTs (whether in
promoting ingroup identity or developing ingroup schisms)
challenges the notion that CT belief is inherently socially
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disengaged: rather, there is a sense of wanting to re-make society
and the inchoate hope that being involved with other CT believers
may contribute to this.
Political Action
Our follow-up interviews in Stage 2 took place just after the time
of a United Kingdom General Election in 2015. When asked, 13
participants reported having voted in the election (and voting/not
voting was not connected to particular CT type). Participation
in other forms of political activity was varied and unconnected
to the typology. Some talked of general, sweeping political aims.
For example, R7 asserted, “Political systems in every country
need to be abolished and redone,” whilst R4 mentioned the aim
to “transform representative politics into enactment politics” –
direct action replacing voting. Others engaged in more specific
activities – for example, attending meet ups (R3 and R17),
setting up websites (R6) or writing books on relevant topics
(R3 and R 6). Whereas some were involved in organizing
demonstrations and meetups (R12 and R17), others expressed
a sense of powerlessness concerning political action (R11, R16,
and R15) – for example, taking part in demonstrations is the
least effective form of political action, and so is encouraged by
governments: “if you can get people marching, demonstrating,
protesting, it keeps them focussed on ineffective action. And the
real effective action is financial action, legal action or political
action, but none of that happens if they go on a demonstration”
(R11). Others suggest that the potential for successful political
action is vitiated by the very nature of the ingroup (R2, R9).
For example, R2 stated, “my main frustrations with Occupy and
all these other activist organizations that we could quite easily
win if we addressed and stuck to the main causes. In other
words we presented a coherent narrative but you have all these
demonstrations talking about symptoms and they never come
together and so they are ineffectual in that sense.” Taken together,
this theme suggests that embracing CTs does not necessarily
entail political cynicism or disengagement from all democratic
processes; rather, CT believers appear potentially engaged in
politics and citizenship but skeptical about the available means in
conventional politics. Thus, the conspiratorial worldview might
relate to prefigurative political or social mobilization, in particular
the imaginary construction of “alternatives,” with little account of
detailed means for achieving that goal (see Yates, 2015).
The Future
The question of the future concerned the degree of optimism
about possible personal and collective change. The broad
pattern was intuitively paradoxical: the more monological our
participants were, the more optimistic they seemed to be,
though that optimism was contingent. For Type 4, a non-
conspiratorial future was contingent on the discovery and public
knowledge of the conspiracies in the political world: when
everyone wakes up, the political world would be transformed
into a non-conspiratorial world [paralleling Byford’s (2011)
“naïve optimism”]. For Type 5, the positive future was more
contingent on individuals coming to understand their relation to
the supernatural forces that govern the universe: self-discovery
allows coming to terms with those forces, though not thereby
removing the supernaturally based conspiracies. Monologicality
thus leads to the possibility of major future change. By contrast,
those with a less monological worldview tended to be less
optimistic about the future, because each conspiracy must be
assessed and challenged on its own terms. Type 3 participants, for
example, see the likelihood of change as restricted by the reality
of specific, concrete conspiracies and their entanglement with
power relations.
DISCUSSION
Monologicality and the Spectrum of
Conspiratorial Worldviews
Monologicality designates the empirical tendency for belief in
one CT to be correlated with belief in others. Explanations of
monologicality often invoke a nomothetical or “closed” mindset
(Goertzel, 1994) whereby mutually supporting beliefs about the
nature of the world are used to interpret public events as
conspiracies. But research on monologicality typically has little
discussion of the content of beliefs and reasoning from the
standpoint of the CT believers. This in part arises from the access
problem (Wood and Douglas, 2015): CT believers are averse to
being researched because they often distrust researchers as “part
of the problem.”
Our study investigated the symbolic resources underlying
monologicality by reconstructing a conspiracy worldview – an
escalating set of beliefs held by CT believers about important
dimensions of ontology, epistemology, and human agency
(Koltko-Rivera, 2004). To do this, we analyzed media documents,
conducted field observation, and engaged in semi-structured
interviews, using a variety of strategies to overcome the access
problem. We described six main dimensions of such a putative
worldview: The nature of reality and its ontology, the description
of self, the outgroup, the ingroup, action, and the future. Patterns
of positions on these dimensions led us to construct a typology of
five types of escalating CT believers. Our findings converge with
prior explorations of the content of CT beliefs: Some are similar
to Byford’s (2011) generic “anatomy” of CTs, derived from the
analysis of documents, cultural artifact and mass media sources.
However, we also discovered novel aspects of the conspiracy
worldview. Perhaps most surprising concerned the ingroup,
which was structured and subtle, embracing both epistemic
and affiliative dimensions. Byford does suggest that from the
1960s onward, “conspiracy theory became a call to mobilization,
inspiring readers to gather ‘evidence,’ share it with others and
become part of a community” (p.67), but there is little detailed
analysis of such community. This is perhaps unsurprising,
since his data sources (written outputs expressing CTs) do
not offer straightforward means of assessing relations to group
membership and identity. Moreover, we find evidence of a leader-
follower relation, with experts viewed as “hero” researchers,
fearless in their critical inquiry and uncovering of unpalatable
truths. Another novel finding is the trajectory toward becoming a
CT believer – a personal journey of conversion or development.
For our participants, this was key to why they believed in CTs,
and the type of CT to which they subscribed. Final novel aspects
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of our findings concerned the connection between participants’
beliefs in CTs and their tendency to engage in political action (as
opposed to being disengaged from the political process), and their
belief in the possibility that such action could lead to a positive
future (as opposed to being cynically resigned to there being no
possibility of a non-conspiratorial world).
All of these novel aspects – the sense of community, the
pantheon of leaders, the personal conversion journey, the link to
political action, and the optimistic future – are at odds with the
typical image of monological CT believers as paranoid, cynical,
anomic, irrational individuals (Douglas et al., 2016). Instead,
the CT worldview may be the underpinning of a nascent social
movement, prefigurative political mobilization, or at the very
least an inchoate, but distributed community of engaged citizens,
albeit with alternative beliefs. In this respect, our findings echo
Waters’s (1997) finding that African American CT believers
were better educated, more politically active, and more socially
engaged that non-believers. Our findings can also explain the
otherwise incongruous results (Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2014)
that CT believers may be more open to experience and more
strongly support democratic principles than non-believers.
Limitations
Our study has some limitations. First, the sample of interviews
is rather limited in size, geographical location and political-
ideological bent – all of which limit generalizability of our
findings. We interviewed only a small number of people and
mostly in the South East of the United Kingdom. Perhaps the
most serious is the political bent: the majority of our participants
were on the left of the political spectrum, self-identifying as
interested in “alternative” explanations. It is unclear to what
degree the elements of the conspiratorial worldview would hold
equally for a similar sample of the milieu on the political right.
Is the CT worldview of right-wing CT believers fundamentally
different? There is little research on this issue, but some data
suggest that it may not be. A report on the right-wing milieu
in Germany commissioned by the Amadeu Antonio Foundation
(Rathe et al., 2015) suggests that many elements may be similar;
other analyses also suggest that right-wing conspiracy worldviews
are analogous in their ingredients to what we have documented,
although they may focus more systematically on Zionism in their
characterization of evil elites (Byford, 2011; Imhoff, 2015).
The small sample suggests caution in a specific aspect of
our interpretation: most of our participants cluster in Types
4 and 5, and fewer in Types 1–3. As noted above, our data
coding combined both bottom-up, data-driven elements (hence
all of the novel findings above), and top-down, theory-driven
(or past findings-driven) elements. The latter grounds our
postulation of Types 1–3: they are internally consistent patterns
of response to destabilizing issues, which reflect different degrees
of dissatisfaction with official stories. They also allow us to
make coherent the idea of a conversion-related trajectory from
skeptical conventional thinking (Type 1) through specific CT
beliefs (Type 3) to monologicality (Types 4 and 5).
Notwithstanding this, our findings broadly converge with
Byford’s (2011) analyses based on a broad set of political
documents and commentary, with perhaps those concerning the
sense of community afforded by CT believers and the nature and
role of Type 3 requiring further empirical substantiation.
Accessing CT Believers and other
Methodological Issues
Our research approached the problem of gaining access to CT
believers using methods from ethnography in two ways, both of
which are time-consuming and painstaking. One was to gain trust
of participants during recruitment by avoiding stigmatization
through terms like “conspiracy theory” and adopting an open-
minded attitude to their beliefs. The second was to increase the
credibility of the research team by recruiting participants via
gatekeepers who were themselves already in a position of trust.
Our results suggest that findings of quantitative,
questionnaire-based studies of CTs may benefit from being
supplemented by qualitative studies that seek to uncover nuances
of the contents and social implications of CT belief. In this way,
a rounded view of conspiratorial worldviews may be achieved.
Content-wise, the kinds of CTs offered for assent or dissent in
questionnaire studies typically fall under our Type 3 or Type 4,
which deploy everyday ontology often with specific claims of
supernormal agency on the part of the conspirators. The result
is a classic, negative monologicality. There is, interestingly, little
quantitative investigation of possible CTs based on supernatural
ontologies, though CT belief itself has been found to correlate
with non-conspiratorial supernatural beliefs (Darwin et al., 2011;
Swami et al., 2011).
Conspiracist Worldviews and the
Quasi-Religious Approach to CTs:
Research Directions
The quasi-religious approach to CTs (Franks et al., 2013) suggests
that CTs can – to differing degrees – function in a manner
analogous to religious beliefs, which may suggest that some CT
belief should correlate with actual religious or supernatural beliefs
(as for Type 5 participants). Belief in CTs might more generally
be based on the form of religiosity called “quest” (Batson et al.,
1993). This reflects a search after meaning that poses existential
questions, regards doubting and skepticism as positive forces,
and allows that answers to those questions may be tentative
and partial – perhaps connecting to agnosticism (e.g., Donahue,
1985), or a cognitive style expressing symbolic doubt, rather than
a specifically religious motivation (e.g., Neyrinck et al., 2010).
For many of our participants, this is apt: CTs and alternative
explanations are a secular “quest,” which may or may not end
in belief in supernatural ontology (Type 5) or in ascribing
exceptional agency to conspiring groups (Type 4).
So in our view, monologicality may be less a defining feature
of believing in CTs, but rather a variable consequence of the
set of CTs believed. To the extent that the set of espoused CTs
grows, a degree of monologicality may emerge – but built on
two foundations. One is a negative claim (rejection of official
explanations, as in many past findings), and the other is a positive
claim (Type 5 imputing of supernatural agents with exceptional
agency, or Type 4 imputing of exceptional control or power to
the conspiratorial group (Franks et al., 2013; Douglas et al., 2016).
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Together they express a clear conviction of our participants – that
CTs may not merely express cynicism and disengagement from
the status quo, but also involve positive attempts to understand
and explain events leading to prescriptions for political action.
Secondly, the approach also offers a substantive view of
how people can represent apparently contradictory CTs (see
Wood et al., 2012). As for many religious representations, the
element of uncertainty means that the content of CTs may not
be fully explicated by believers: Types 4 and 5 CTs represent
conspiring groups with greater-than-natural agency, but precisely
what those qualities are and how those agents actually operate
may remain unclear. Contradictions between CTs may not
be detected or experienced as contradictions by believers,
because the representations of the CTs do not have precise
interpretations, and so do not support a sharp sense of conflict.
They may thus permit coexistence of apparently contradictory
knowledge systems (Legare and Gelman, 2008) or cognitive
polyphasia (Jovchelovitch, 2006; Falade and Bauer, 2017), in
which aspects of conventional and conspiratorial worldviews
offer complementary, rather than competing explanations of
destabilizing events.
Thirdly, our findings and the quasi-religious approach suggest
further investigation of the active social cognitive processes
of ‘bricolage’ of CT beliefs (e.g., how far they follow the
heuristics suggested by Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009) – since
CT believers are not only choosy with the contents that they
draw from official sources, but also with content from alternative
sources.
Fourthly, as noted our typology requires further investigation:
how robust is it across participants with different demographic
and political profiles? And, delving inside it, are there quasi-
religious conversion processes from Type 1 where the world
seems out of joint to Type 5 where reality is perceived as
an illusion and an alternative ontology is invoked? What
psychological processes lead from domain-specific distrust of
authority (Type 3) to domain-general distrust (Type 4): when
and why does the request for positive reasons to trust official
explanations transition into an assumption that no reasons can
be provided? It seems likely that group membership plays an
important role here; this is a core feature of our Types 4 and 5,
but is absent from the others. When and why does dissatisfaction
with ordinary explanations (or with general CTs using ordinary
ontologies – Type 4) transmute into the positive espousal of
alternative ontologies in monological CTs – Type 5? This may
have its root in the specific type of inquiry that characterizes
the person’s quest – for example, a more political issue of
control versus a more personal issue of identity. Answering
such questions may require longitudinal studies focusing on
the personal developmental trajectories – in biographical–
idiographical terms – of CT believers.
Fifthly, the social and inter-group relations also warrant
further investigation. The role of the internet in sharing and
discussing CTs has been emphasized recently (e.g., Wood and
Douglas, 2013, 2015). Our research demonstrates that the
internet is also important in developing and supporting in vivo
social relations and social group and social identity formation.
CTs are not static, but rather dynamic beliefs that relate to
individual life projects and to social behavior of various kinds.
We found communicating about CTs can underpin definition
and critique of outgroups, as in past research, but also formation
of coherent ingroups with implications for social identity
(Jovchelovitch, 2006). This suggests a further potentially fruitful
area of research – how do such groupings form on-line and
oﬄine? How do individuals move from blogging on-line to
meeting in vivo? What are the social functions of CTs, as well
as their social consequences? What role do on-line and off-line
group leaders perform in curating CT beliefs, and how do they
relate to the ideas publicized by more widely known “CT heroes”?
Sixth, our findings suggest broadening the canvas of political
actions relevant to CTs. Our participants held nuanced views of
political action and – whilst some were cynical about its effect –
most saw a requirement of their self-representation as “truth
seekers” as putting forward concrete positive explanations and
proposals for change.
Seventh – practically, our findings may have implications
regarding addressing the consequences of CT belief. They suggest
the need to consider not only the degree or strength of CT belief
but also its content, in entertaining any practical measures to
address problematic consequences of a CT worldview. Location
of CT believers in our typology might, for example, moderate
the impact of educational measures to combat potential effects
of negative CTs (Douglas et al., 2016), or the engagement with
CT social groups and leaders to ameliorate CT-related political
extremism (Bartlett and Miller, 2010).
Eighth – methodologically, our typology might be the basis
of an alternative quantitative measurement of CT mentality, one
which involves the detailed symbolic resources of CTs rather
than (as in more typical, Likert-like survey methods) sketches of
those resources to measure their connection to other variables.
Our typology is based on specific configurations of values of the
key features of reality, self, ingroup, outgroup, action and the
future. One construal of our Types 1 and 5 CT beliefs is that
they combine the least elaborated and most highly elaborated
conspiracist ideation, respectively, and between them there is a
continuum of elaboration. Such a relation between a hierarchy of
specific beliefs and an emergent continuum is typically discussed
as a Guttman-type approach to developing a unidimensional
scale for beliefs. This approach has been taken by researchers in
the sociology of religion (Michelat, 1991), and might find some
utility in quasi-religious conspiracy beliefs.
A final question that arises is: if at least some CT belief
is not monological, how should it be described? What is the
alternative to monologicality? Returning again to Goertzel (1994:
p. 740), he claims, “Dialogical belief systems engage in a dialog
with their context, while monological systems speak only to
themselves, ignoring their context in all but the shallowest
respects.” We used the subsequent empirical operationalisation
of monologicality as the idea that belief in one CT is predictive
of belief in (many) more, and found that even our most
monological participants (Types 4 and 5) were still dialogical
in Goertzel’s terms; that is, they utilized non-conspiratorial
symbolic contents in the framing of their CTs and drew selectively
and critically on both conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial
evidence in their justification. Future work might investigate the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 June 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 861
fpsyg-08-00861 June 16, 2017 Time: 14:1 # 15
Franks et al. Beyond “Monologicality”?
possible connections with the contrast between monological and
dialogical approaches to communication (Linell, 2009), which
is likely to be important to the social sense-making function
of CTs, as part of understanding how CT believers manage
the coexistence of conspiratorial and conventional beliefs in
explaining events.
CONCLUSION
Conspiracy theories are widespread and important cultural
forms of mind that enable symbolic sense making about
threatening events or situations. Past quantitative research
has suggested that CT belief may be monological, such that
belief in one CT is predictive of belief in others. We sought
to investigate the symbolic resources that form the contents
of such beliefs by carrying out qualitative interviews with
people who espouse them; in doing so, we developed an
approach to address the difficulty of accessing the population
of CT believers. Our results confirm, augment and to some
degree challenge past findings, suggesting that different elements
of CT beliefs coalesce to form a distinctive conspiratorial
worldview, within which particular patterns form an escalating
typology of CT mentality, only some of which are monological.
Monologicality is thus not a defining feature of conspiratorial
mentality, but only a special case. This finding and our
concept of CT as quasi-religious lead to new directions for
future research and possible methodological and practical
implications.
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